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May 12, 2009
Abstract
This paper addresses the role of independent insurance intermediaries in markets where
matching is important. A controversial matter in the discussion concerning insurance interme-
diation is the issue of compensation customs and how the latter a¤ect prices, rents and advice
quality in insurance markets. This work compares a fee-based with a commission-based system.
We show that in a situation with a non-strategic intermediary both remuneration systems are
payo¤-equivalent. In a second step, allowing for strategic behavior, we discuss the impact of
remuneration on the quality of advice. The analysis shows that the possibility of mismatching
can provide the intermediary with substantial market power which however does not translate
into mismatching as long as consumers have rational expectations. We o¤er a rationale for the
use of contingent commissions. In addition, this paper addresses whether or not the recent ban
of any commission payments as introduced in countries such as Denmark and Finland is an
appropriate market intervention.
JEL Classication: G22, G24, L51
1 Introduction
Middlemen play an important role in markets with signicant imperfections. Essentially, as pointed
out by Yavas (1994), there are two di¤erent types of intermediaries that facilitate market transac-
tions. Market makers, on the one hand, such as stock market specialists, act on their own account
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by buying a certain good from a seller at a bid price and reselling it to buyers at an ask price.
On the other hand, matchmakers, like real estate brokers, simply match sellers and buyers with-
out being an active trading party. As studied by Biglaiser (1993), middlemen are usually experts
with superior information about market conditions and product characteristics. Hence, they may
enhance market e¢ ciency by providing consulting services for market participants.
In insurance markets independent agents and brokers act mainly as matchmakers and o¤er
supplementary services for both policyholders and insurance companies. The work of Regan (1997)
as well as Regan and Tennyson (1996) suggests that independent agents are better at both assessing
risk and servicing consumers in more uncertain markets and in complex product lines than for
example exclusive agents. However, the primary market function of intermediation depends on
the market environment in which transactions take place. One distinction with respect to the
intermediarys role obviously needs to be made between life and property-liability insurance (see, for
instance, Regan and Tennyson, 2000). In life insurance markets the broker is mainly concerned with
writing new business and matching consumers with appropriate insurance products. In property-
liability insurance, typically renewal business matters signicantly besides new business. Depending
on the line of insurance the broker also has an important function in collecting and providing risk
information for the insurance company in order to prevent adverse selection.
Commissions paid by insurance companies are still the major source of underwriting-related
income for independent intermediaries. Most commission payments are related to the signing
of the contract and condition mostly on the insurance premium. In addition to these "premium-
based commissions", intermediaries may also receive "contingent commissions". These commissions
are ex post payments of insurance companies which base on various performance criteria such as
protability of the business placed or the volume of business with that specic insurer.
Recent events involving major insurance companies and insurance brokerage rms have directed
the focus of attention to the remuneration of independent agents and brokers. In one rather promi-
nent case, collusion between one of the biggest American insurance brokers and several insurance
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companies took place.1 A coalition of commercial insurance companies agreed to pay contingent
commissions for brokers, and in return, the receiving brokers presented their consumers high pre-
mium pseudo-o¤ers from other coalition members. Partly in response to the above-mentioned
incident, regulatory changes have been introduced around the world. For example, Finland and
Denmark have implemented a ban of any insurance company-paid commissions.2 Other Euro-
pean countries have yet not gone that far, but introduced voluntary codes of conduct according to
which brokers are not allowed to be compensated by both sides of the market, insurance compa-
nies and consumers, at the same time.3 These developments amplify an ongoing discussion which
had already led to interventions, such as the European Directive (2002/92/EC) on insurance in-
termediation. The latter aimed at improving broker service quality by means of information and
documentation requirements in combination with professional liability and mandatory liability in-
surance. In addition to this, some regulators address transparency of compensation directly. As
part of its reform of insurance contract law, Germany, for instance implemented an act that makes
life insurance companies disclose the amount of acquisition and distribution costs as part of the
insurance premium.4
In order to understand and evaluate existing compensation customs, the economic implica-
tions of di¤erent feasible compensation regimes have to be analyzed. In our view, the current
compensation-related discussion boils down to answering the following questions: Who should pay
the broker (consumer vs. insurer)? What is an adequate compensation basis (in particular volume
vs. protability)? Should the amount of broker compensation be transparent for the consumer?
Naturally, well-founded answers to these questions require an analysis that pays attention to the
characteristics of the specic insurance markets in question.
In this paper, we are concentrating on lines of insurance where the broker is mainly concerned
with adequate matching and the brokers role in collecting and providing information for the insurer
1See, e.g., Ruquet and Hays (2004).
2See, European Commission (2007), p. 100.
3See, Ladbury (2007), p. 29.
4See, German Ministry of Justice, "Bundestag adopts new law on insurance contracts," Press Release, July 5,
2007.
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is of minor importance. Examples may be certain markets for life and property-liability insurance,
where products are complex for the consumer and the main task for a broker is nding an adequate
product. Of course we acknowledge that in these lines of insurance information regarding the
consumers risk type is critical and is actually normally collected by the broker as part of the
underwriting process. Our point, however, is that most information collected is "hard" in the sense
that this information is veriable ex post, implying that truthful information disclosure can be
enforced by means of contractual provisions. Therefore, the brokers discretion or in other words
her inuence on the quality of information for an insurance company is limited. Given the focus
of our theoretical analysis, we are able to derive some general results with respect to the question
of who should compensate the broker. Regarding the compensation basis and transparency, our
results suggest intuitive and straightforward conclusions which however strongly depend on the
structure of our framework. Hence, further analytical research into these aspects seems to be quite
promising.
Generally, in respect to the compensation of brokers there is a general intuition that favors a
fee-for-advice system, where the broker is compensated by the consumer. One rather naive reason
for this kind of opinion is that in a fee-for-advice system advice and the insurance product are
sold separately. Thus, welfare would be greater under a fee-for-advice system, because in this
remuneration system the broker is not directly a¤ected by the purchasing decision of the potential
policyholders. Gravelle (1993, 1994) tackles this type of argument by a theoretical comparison of
commission and fee-for-advice based compensation systems for independent life-insurance agents.
In his model brokers face search cost, and entry in the broker market is endogenous. One of the
problems he identies is that too few consumers become informed under a fee regime. Consequently,
even though a fee-based compensation system may lead to a higher intermediation quality, it is
not necessarily superior to a commission system once the number of brokers and overall purchases
by consumers are taken into account. Hofmann and Nell (2008) compare a fee-for-advice and a
commission system in a duopoly market with uninformed consumers where only matching matters.
They show that in a situation with a completely non-strategic broker commissions are superior
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to a fee-for-advice system, due to consumers transaction cost. In contrast to their model, we
explicitly consider the impact of compensation on the quality of advice which in our view is one
of the key issues with respect to the discussion about regulatory action. Schiller (2008) considers
a duopoly market where both matching and risk classication of consumers matter. In this setup
also the commission system is superior, as it provides incentives for proper risk classication.
Cummins and Doherty (2006) emphasize that prot-related contingent commissions should align
insurance companiesand brokersinterests with respect to consumersrisk classication. In this
respect, Regan and Kle¤ner (2007) empirically explore the impact of contingent commissions on
the underwriting performance of insurance companies. Among other things they nd that higher
proportions of contingent commissions are associated with lower loss ratios which supports the
incentive argument for contingent commission payments. In contrast to this result Ma et al. (2008)
show that the usage of contingent commissions is associated with cost and revenue ine¢ ciencies.
This paper challenges recent regulatory ambitions to ban commissions in a specic environment
where the broker is only concerned with matching consumers with appropriate insurance products.
One of our rst straightforward results is that the choice of compensation system and hence the
question of who should compensate the broker is irrelevant as long as the broker acts completely
non-strategic. In this setting both a commission and a fee-for-advice system are  apart from
bargaining power issues payo¤equivalent. The brokers superior information about the consumers
best match together with the ability to mismatch gives the broker endogenous bargaining power
with respect to insurance companies. In a pure fee-for-advice system the broker is unable to execute
her bargaining power because she cannot collect any payments from insurance companies. This
limitation, on the one hand side, has the advantage that the broker does not have any incentives
for mismatching, as mismatching reduces the consumerswillingness to pay for the intermediation
service and consequently the feasible fee-for-advice. On the other hand, the broker is tempted to
engage in side-contracting with insurance companies in order to transform her bargaining power into
monetary payments. As long as side-contracting is e¢ cient, both insurance companies will agree
on side-payments (contingent commissions) to the broker in order to prevent losing market share
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and consumers will in equilibrium be perfectly matched. Hence, when strategic mismatching by the
broker is feasible, a fee-for-advice system with e¢ cient side-contracting is again payo¤ equivalent to
a commission system, because in a commission system insurance companies explicitly compete in
commission rates and mismatching is actually not taking place in equilibrium. However, if brokers
are by law not allowed to collect any payments from insurance companies, e¢ cient side-contracting
is questionable. As the broker is still interested in executing her bargaining power, she might
be tempted to illegally collect certain payments from a limited number of insurance companies
which might imply mismatching incentives. In consideration of our results, one can argue that any
regulatory action which gears into a ban of commission payments to the brokers is likely to be
ine¤ective or even worse might unintentionally lead to mismatching incentives.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the model framework is in-
troduced and a situation without intermediation is analyzed. Section 3 determines outcomes in
intermediated insurance markets and in particular compares a fee-for-advice with a commission
system when brokers act completely non-strategic. Consequently, in section 4, we compare both
remuneration systems when the broker strategically matches consumers and discuss further impli-
cations of the model regarding recent regulatory reforms and voluntary codes. Finally, section 5
concludes.
2 Model without intermediation
The purpose of this section is to characterize the market result without intermediation and to
determine the welfare loss which is due to the presence of uninformed consumers in the insurance
market. Following DAspremont et al. (1979), Hotelling (1929) and Schultz (2004), we consider an
insurance market with risk neutral consumers5 who have heterogeneous preferences. A consumer is
located at x 2 [0; 1], which represents his risk prole.6 For simplicity reasons, each individual risk
5For simplicity reasons consumers are assumed to be risk neutral, since we are not interested in any risk allocation
problems, and the standard assumption of risk aversion does not change basic trade-o¤s and hence qualitative results.
For a model with risk-averse consumers see, e.g., Hofmann and Nell (2008).
6Risk prolehere refers to the consumers individual preferences concerning the insurance product characteris-
tics.
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prole is assumed to be associated with the same marginal cost (expected loss) c > 0. A consumers
willingness to pay for an insurance policy is v > 0, and he purchases one insurance policy at most.
There are two insurance companies, j = 0; 1, which are located at the two extremes of the risk
prole interval. Company 0 o¤ers a policy at x = 0 and company 1 at x = 1.
Since insurance is a rather complex product, it is assumed that only a fraction  2 (0; 1] of
consumers is informed about their precise risk prole or, technically, their location in the interval
[0; 1] and the rmslocation. Informed and uninformed consumers are uniformly distributed.
Consumers face a disutility from purchasing an imperfectly matching insurance product. If
insurance companies charge premiums 0 and 1, consumer x receives a net utility v   0   tx
from buying a policy from insurer 0 and v   1   t (1  x) from buying a policy from insurer 1,
where t > 0 measures the marginal disutility of a mismatch.7 An informed consumer is indi¤erent
between buying from company 0 and 1 if she is located at
x = x (0; 1)  1   0 + t
2t
(1)
Uninformed consumers only form expectations xe and e regarding their actual own risk prole
x and prices . Their respective net utility of buying insurance coverage is v e0  txe if coverage
is purchased from company 0 and v   e1   t (1  xe) if consumers buy from insurer 1. Since we
concentrate on symmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies8 where both insurance companies set
the same price  and serve both groups of consumers, uninformed consumers with rational expec-
tations xe = 12 are ex ante indi¤erent between both rms, since 
e
0 = 
e
1 = 
. Consequently, they
randomly choose their insurance carrier. Subsequently, we assume that each insurance company
attracts half of the uninformed consumers.
7 If the consumer is neither located in x = 0 nor in x = 1, he is not able to buy a perfectly matching product. This
leads to a di¤erence between his most preferred product characteristics and those o¤ered. The resulting disutility of
mismatch is measured by the distance between the consumers location x and the chosen product, multiplied by t.
8For further analyses concerning mixed strategy equilibria and the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium see,
e.g., Hofmann and Nell (2008), Schultz (2005) and Varian (1980).
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In order to simplify our analysis, the willingness to pay for consumers v, is assumed to be9
v  c+

2 + 
2

t: (2)
Insurer 0s demand is given by
D0 (0; 1) = 
1   0 + t
2t
+ (1  ) 1
2
: (3)
and rm s respective demand is given by D1 (1; 0) = 1 D0 (0; 1). Given (3) the prot of
company 0 is
0 (0; 1) = (0   c)


1   0 + t
2t
+ (1  ) 1
2

: (4)
Equilibrium prices are given by
@0
@0
=
 [1   20 + c] + t
2t
!
= 0: (5)
Using the symmetry of the problem, one can obtain the symmetric Nash equilibrium price level
of
 = c+
t

(6)
and a resulting equilibrium prot of
j =
t
2
: (7)
The expected ex ante net utility of uninformed consumers ueu is given by
ueu = v   c  t

2 + 
2

; (8)
9The opposite case is not considered, since without intermediation there would be two separated monopolistic
markets, in which both insurance companies can set their prices independently.
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whereas informed consumers derive the respective expected ex ante net utility of
uei = v   c  t

4 + 
4

: (9)
Comparing (8) and (9) highlights the welfare loss due to the random matching of insurance
companies and uninformed consumers. Since the latter do not have any information about their own
location, they choose their respective insurance company randomly. Thus, from a social planners
point of view, half of the uninformed consumers match with the wrong insurance company. This
mismatching causes a welfare loss of
(1  )

1
2
t  1
4
t

= (1  ) 1
4
t: (10)
Using (7), (8), and (9), the overall welfare in the economy, given by the weighted sum of ex
ante net utilities (ueu; u
e
i ) and insurersprots
P
j 

j is
 = v   c 

2  
4

t: (11)
The derived overall welfare without intermediation is the reference for the social protability of
intermediation in markets with uninformed consumers.
3 Intermediation
In this section a completely non-strategic insurance broker is incorporated into the analysis. We fo-
cus on the welfare increasing e¤ect of an honest intermediary who exclusively improves the matching
process between uninformed consumers and insurance companies.
In the considered situation a broker can only be valuable, if she has compared to uninformed
consumers  access to superior information. To keep things as simple as possible, the broker is
assumed to be endowed with an information technology that incurs variable cost k > 0 and reveals
the position x of a consumer perfectly.
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Our analysis will be divided into two parts which di¤er with respect to the payment structure
between insurance company, broker and consumer. In the rst case, the broker is compensated
directly by the insureds (fee-for-advice system). Particularly, neither communication nor monetary
transfers between the broker and the insurance company are taking place. In this remuneration
system, an insurance company cannot distinguish informed and initially uninformed consumers, who
were informed by a broker. In the second case, insurance companies pay the broker (commission
system). As the broker is compensated for every individual initially uninformed consumer, insurance
companies are able to distinguish di¤erent consumer types.
3.1 Fee-for-advice
Let us now turn to the analysis of the fee-for-advice remuneration system. The sequence of the
game is as follows: At stage 1 insurance companies simultaneously announce their prices j . Then,
at stage 2, the broker makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er f (fee-for-advice) for an individual risk
analysis.10 At stage 3, uninformed consumers decide whether to request a risk analysis or not.
Finally, at stage 4, all consumers decide whether and where to purchase an insurance policy.11
Solving the game by backward induction, we start analyzing stage 4. At this last stage we have
to distinguish two di¤erent types of initially uninformed consumers: uninformed who requested
a risk analysis at stage 3 and those who decided to stay uninformed. Both groups have three
options: Buy insurance from company 0, buy insurance from company 1 or stay uninsured. If
consumers prefer to stay uninformed, they will at stage 4 expect symmetric price o¤ers j =  8j
and randomly purchase insurance from one of the two insurance companies. Therefore, if   v  12 t,
uninformed consumers prefer to buy insurance. As any fee-for-advice is sunk at stage 4, consumers
at the location x 2 [0; 1] who consulted with a broker are indi¤erent between purchasing insurance
10We do not consider any specic kind of explicit negotiations with any arbitrary allocation of bargaining power,
because this would just imply a reallocation of rents between the broker and insurance companies.
11Since in equilibrium all uninformed consumers either ask for the brokers services or remain uninformed, other
game sequences have no impact on the qualitative results. The game could be reorganized without any loss of
generality so that the broker o¤ers the price for his service at stage 1, just before the insurers announce their
premiums.
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from company 0 and company 1 if
v   0   tx  f = v   1   (1  x) t  f (12)
and therefore
x =
1   0 + t
2t
: (13)
Thus, if insurance companies charge symmetric prices with j =  8j, initially uninformed
consumers, who became informed at stage 3, prefer to buy their insurance policy at the nearest
insurance company if   v   12 t holds. In this case, the expected utility of becoming informed is
v   f   14 t. Without loss of generality, we now use the interim assumption that both consumer
types purchase insurance at stage 4. The fact that insurance is purchased by all types of consumers
in equilibrium will be shown subsequently.
At stage 3 uninformed consumers prefer to become informed about their own risk prole if
v     f   1
4
t  v     1
2
t, f  1
4
t: (14)
At stage 2 the broker o¤ers her risk analysis service at f = 14 t and yields non-negative prots
of12
f = (1  )

1
4
t  k

: (15)
In this situation due to (12) all uninformed consumers purchase the risk analysis and become
informed about their own risk prole. As the broker makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er, the equilibrium
fee-for-advice is f = 14 t. Otherwise, if k >
1
4 t holds, all uninformed consumers prefer to remain
uninformed about their risk prole. Therefore, no intermediation takes place and the equilibrium
results derived in section 2 are unchanged.
The protability condition k  14 t has direct implications for the relevance of intermediation
in di¤erent types of insurance markets. As the product space in our model is normalized to one,
12For the sake of simplicity, we assume that uninformed consumers accept the o¤er if they are indi¤erent between
accepting and rejecting.
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we cannot directly model di¤erent types of markets. Our model, however, still enables us to draw
conclusions based upon specic characteristics of commercial versus individual insurance markets.
Obviously, given the product space, di¤erent types of insurance markets can in our framework be
characterized by the parameters k and t.
Real insurance marketsstructure suggests that intermediation tends to be more relevant in com-
mercial and reinsurance than in non-commercial markets. This observation can also be explained
in our framework. One could argue that the range of potential risk proles in commercial markets
is relatively larger than in non-commercial markets, implying that the disutility of mismatch, mea-
sured by t, ceteris paribus is greater in commercial markets. Although the costs of risk analyses k
in commercial insurance markets are as well presumably greater than in non-commercial markets,
intermediation becomes more protable if the relative increase in the disutility of mismatch exceeds
the increase in the risk analyses costs.
Given that the risk analysis performed by the broker is protable, eventually each consumer
makes an informed decision at stage 4. Therefore, the insurersprice decision at stage 1 is as if all
consumers are initially informed. Using  = 1 and f = 14 t
13, the analysis of section 2 leads directly
to the equilibrium premium
f = c+ t (16)
and a resulting equilibrium prot of
fj =
t
2
(17)
In a situation in which consumers pay the brokerage fees directly, the ex ante expected net
utility of informed and uninformed consumers is given by
ufi = v   c 
5
4
t (18)
13Again, a variation of f can be interpreted as a change in the allocation of bargaining power between the parties
involved.
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and
ufu = v   c 
3
2
t (19)
The resulting overall welfare f in this situation equals the weighted sum of the ex ante net
utilities of consumers (18) and (19) and both the prots of the broker (15) and the insurance
companies (17) with
f = v   c  (1  ) k   1
4
t = : (20)
In this case, intermediation leads to an increase in welfare if and only if k  14 t. Thus, if
intermediation is individually rational for uninformed consumers, it will also be protable from
a social planners point of view. However, a comparison of (7) and (17) indicates that market
intermediation by a broker reduces the insurers prots. This is due to an increase in market
transparency which intensies price competition in the insurance market.
3.2 Commission system
Turning towards the commission system, we now address whether or not the latter result concern-
ing the social protability of intermediation remains the same. Generally, in a commission system
brokers are compensated by insurance companies for successful intermediation. Therefore, in this
system insurance companies have the opportunity to discriminate prices between informed con-
sumers, uninformed consumers and initially uninformed consumers who received information from
the broker. First of all, a commission system has the potential advantage for insurance companies
to extract additional rents from uninformed consumers if they can prevent these consumers from
buying contracts designed for informed ones. With respect to price discrimination we consider
two cases which di¤er in regard to price di¤erentiation abilities between uninformed an informed
consumers.
In line with the previous section the sequence of the game with a commission system is as
follows: At stage 1 insurance companies simultaneously announce their prices ij for informed and
uj for uninformed consumers. Then, at stage 2, the broker makes a price o¤er g (commission) for
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an individual risk analysis. At stage 3, uninformed consumers decide whether or not to request a
risk analysis. Finally, at stage 4, all consumers decide whether and where to purchase an insurance
policy.
In a commission system the decision problem for uninformed consumers at stages 3 and 4 is only
slightly changed compared to the fee-for-advice system. The request for a risk analysis on stage 3 is
initially free of charge as the insurance company bears the commission g. If uninformed consumers
utilize the brokers risk analysis service and subsequently purchase insurance, the commission g will
a¤ect prices for insurance at stage 4.
Considering the group of informed consumers rst, the price ij for informed consumers can be
derived directly from the analysis in section 2 using  = 1. The equilibrium insurance premium for
informed consumers therefore corresponds to
ci = c+ t (21)
If markets for informed and uninformed consumers cannot be separated, uninformed consumers
are able to buy insurance products which are designed for informed consumers. Consequently, they
have three available options: Not purchasing any insurance, directly purchasing insurance without
any risk analysis and buying insurance after utilizing the brokers service. In a commission system
not buying insurance is in any case associated with a net utility of zero. If uninformed consumers
decide to buy insurance, they will be able to directly buy insurance from a randomly chosen
insurance company at the price. Purchasing insurance after the performance of a risk analysis is
protable for uninformed consumers as long as
v   u   1
4
t  v   c  3
2
t (22)
holds. The LHS of (22) corresponds to the utility of uninformed consumers from buying insurance
coverage via the broker, whereas the RHS relates to the utility from randomly buying insurance
coverage from one of the two insurance companies in the market for informed consumers.
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In equilibrium, insurers will set premiums such that (22) holds as an equality. Rearranging this,
we get
cu = c+
5
4
t: (23)
Obviously, cu = 
c
i +
1
4 t. Due to (2) both uninformed and informed consumers derive a positive
net utility from purchasing their designated contract at the prices ci and 
c
u.
At stage 3, the broker makes a take-it-or-leave-it commission o¤er g to the insurance companies.
Due to the fact that the broker would still be able to o¤er her services under a fee-for-advice
system directly to uninformed consumers, who could subsequently purchase insurance at the price
for informed consumers, the commission o¤er g makes insurance companies indi¤erent between
both remuneration systems. Therefore,
1
2
(ci + (1  ) [cu   g]  c) = fj (24)
must hold. Rearranging (24) by using (17), (21), (23) yields
g =
1
4
t (25)
Consequently, as the broker extracts the revenue of intermediation, insurance companiesprots
cj =
t
2
(26)
as well as social welfare for k  14 t
c = v   c  (1  ) k   1
4
t =  (27)
are unchanged compared to the fee-for-advice system.
Our analysis so far has shown that the choice of compensation and hence the question of who
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should compensate the broker is irrelevant as long as the broker acts completely non-strategic.
Under the assumptions of this section, both commission and fee-for-advice system are apart from
bargaining power issues payo¤ equivalent.14
4 Quality of advice
The previous analysis implicitly rests on the assumption that the broker acts completely non-
strategic and matches each uninformed consumer with the appropriate insurance product. Com-
parisons for di¤erent brokers remuneration systems, however, should denitely account for strategic
behavior of both the broker and the insurance companies, since a fee-for-advice and a commission
system may lead to di¤erent incentives with respect to quality of advice. In respect to the quality
of advice, maybe the most persistent reservation to a commission system is based on the argument
summarized by Gravelle (1994) that
(...)"a commission system gives greater incentives to provide biased advice to unsophis-
ticated potential consumers."15
In the light of this reservation we briey evaluate a brokers incentives for bad advice under
the di¤erent remuneration systems. In our model setup the broker might engage in matching
uninformed consumers with the inappropriate insurance company, but she will only do so if this is
protable and increases her payo¤s.
Let us now consider a situation in which the broker is interested in increasing her own payo¤s
by means of mismatching. As we assume that consumers are rational, any mismatching activities
negatively a¤ect the expected disutility of uninformed consumers and respectively the ex ante
protability of intermediation. At rst we only consider the case in which the broker colludes
14This result changes if insurance companies are able to distinguish between ex ante uninformed and informed
consumers. It can be shown that in a commission system brokers and insurance companies have an incentive to
separate markets in order to extract rents from uninformed consumers. If this separation of markets between ex ante
uninformed and informed consumers is feasible, a commission system is the preferable compensation system both for
the broker and the insurance companies. However, the separation of markets does not a¤ect social welfare. It solely
a¤ects the allocation of rents.
15Gravelle (1994), p. 425
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with insurance company j = 0: Hence, the broker is able to steer a total amount  2 0; 12 of
uninformed consumers whose appropriate provider of coverage is insurance company j = 1 to
insurance company j = 0.
Generally, for any given ; the expected disutility of mismatching for uninformed consumers
corresponds to "
1
2
+ 
2
+

1
2
  
2# t
2
=

1
4
+ 2

t (28)
In a fee-for-advice system the ex ante participation constraint of uninformed consumers with
mismatching changes to
v     f  

1
4
+ 2

t  v     1
2
t, f 

1
4
  2

t: (29)
As the disutility strictly increases in , an obvious implication of (29) is that any mismatching
negatively a¤ects the brokers ability to extract rents from uninformed consumers via a fee-for-
advice f . Therefore, if the broker is not able to receive any payments from insurance companies,
she will not engage in any mismatching activities. In this case the market outcome corresponds to
our analysis in section 3.1.
However, considering the equilibrium in a pure fee-for-advice system, there are substantial
incentives for side-contracting when the latter is feasible. In order to illustrate the incentives, let us
consider a very simple situation, where the insurance premiums correspond to f = c+ t and the
broker does not face any costs from mismatching, due to a future loss of reputation.16 In this case,
the broker can reach an agreement with insurance company j = 0 that she in return for certain
payments directs  uninformed consumers whose appropriate provider of coverage is insurance
company j = 1 to insurance company j = 0. Any side-contracting opportunities give the broker
endogenous bargaining power, because following the brokers advice is a weakly dominant strategy
for uninformed consumers. Hence, the broker can threaten to steer all uniformed consumer to the
other insurer if a side-contract is rejected.
16See, e.g., Bolton et al. (2007) or Schiller (2008) for such models.
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Subsequently, we illustrate this endogenous bargaining power for a simple bonus contract
B (b) = max
  
D0   12

b; 0

. This contract pays a at per capita bonus (contingent commission)
for every redirected uninformed consumer. If company 0 accepts the side-contract, the resulting
prots for both insurance companies are
0 =
t
2
+ (1  ) [t  b] (30)
and
1 =
t
2
  (1  )t: (31)
As long as b  2t, company 0 always accepts the side-contract, because its prots are higher
than its prots without any uninformed consumers ( t2). Hence, the broker maximizes her prots
by o¤ering the bonus contract B (2t) and choosing  = 12 . Uninformed consumers anticipate that
the broker will match all consumers with the same insurance company. Thus, they are indi¤erent
between buying insurance coverage from the broker or randomly buying insurance from either
insurance company. Their willingness to pay for the intermediation service is zero which implies
f = 0, because all consumers that should be matched with company 1 are matched with 0.
However, side-contracting with only one insurance company is suboptimal if intermediation is
protable with k  14 t. In this situation, performing the risk analysis and matching every consumer
with the appropriate provider of insurance coverage increases the extractable rent and social welfare
by 14 t k. The broker will therefore o¤er a bonus contract Bmfj (t) = max (Djt; 0) to each insurance
company together with the fee-for-advice fmf = 14 t for uninformed consumers. Both insurance
companies weakly prefer to accept the bonus contract and uninformed consumers also weakly prefer
to accept the fee-for-advice, because they will be matched with the appropriate insurance company
with mf = 0. Consequently, in a fee-for-advice system with e¢ cient side-contracting consumers
expected utility is unchanged compared to a situation without side-contracting with umfi = v c  54 t
and umfu = v   c   32 t. Prots of insurance companies are reduced to mfj =  t2 . The brokers
prot is mf = (1  ) 54 t  k : Compared to a situation without strategic intermediation, side-
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contracting only a¤ects the distribution of rents between the broker and the insurance companies.
Social welfare corresponds in this case to the situation with truthful intermediation with mf =
v   c  (1  ) k   14 t = .
Let us now turn to mismatching incentives in a commission system. Considering our previous
results it is striking that the incentive pay in a side-contracting situation and in particular the bonus
rate b resembles a contingent commission paid by the insurance company. This indicates that the
analysis for a pure commission system works in a quite similar manner. The main di¤erence in a
commission system is the fact that both companies explicitly compete for uninformed consumers.
In equilibrium the broker can o¤er the commission rate gmc = 54 t to both companies. Hence,
a commission system with mismatching opportunities for the broker will lead to a second-best
outcome with umci = v   c   54 t, umcu = v   c   32 t; mcj =  t2 , mc = (1  )

5
4 t  k

and
mc = v  c  (1  ) k  14 t =  In respect to real markets, a commission system seems to be the
straightforward approach for reaching e¢ cient market outcomes, due to the explicit competition
for uninformed consumers.
Before we summarize our main results it may be worthwhile to discuss how our analysis relies
on the specic model framework. First of all, one may suppose that whenever insurance companies
have some bargaining power, they are actually able to realize additional prots from mismatching
activities and mismatching may become some kind of rent-seeking activity for insurance companies.
As a matter of fact, the distribution of bargaining power between the broker and the insurance
companies should neither a¤ect the distribution of rents nor the brokers mismatching intensity.
The reason for this result is quite straightforward. Due to her discretion regarding whether and
how to match uninformed consumers, the broker always has a certain endogenous bargaining power.
An individual insurance company has incentives to outbid its opponent as long as accepting the
side-contract leads to weakly higher prots than rejecting it. However, competition in the broker
market may limit the brokers rent extraction abilities by the means of potential mismatching.
The assumption that mismatching does not negatively a¤ect the broker is also not very restric-
tive. If mismatching is costly, for example due to associated future losses in credibility, the broker
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may not mismatch all uninformed consumers. In a situation in which mismatching costs lead to
 < 12 , some uninformed consumers will be matched with insurance company 1. Hence, costs of
mismatching limit the brokers ability to extract rents from insurance companies. However, con-
sumersutility is not a¤ected by any mismatching costs. In respect to social welfare mismatching
costs will be substituted by reputation costs.
5 Conclusions
The core question that this paper addresses is: which party (insurer or consumer) should compen-
sate the insurance broker? The analysis shows that, when brokers act completely non-strategic,
the choice of remuneration system in matching markets does not matter. In both remuneration
systems the broker perfectly matches all uninformed consumers.
However, a meaningful analysis has to take the brokers incentive problem into account. Due
to her private information and the ability to mismatch uninformed consumers, the broker has
endogenous bargaining power dealing with insurance companies. In a situation with a strategic
broker in which (e¢ cient) side-contracting is feasible, insurance companies have to agree upon
side-payments (contingent commissions) in order not to lose market share. As long as all insurance
companies pay contingent commissions, uninformed consumers will be perfectly matched. In this
situation, a fee-for-advice system is again payo¤-equivalent to a traditional commission system. In
the latter insurance companies explicitly compete in contingent commissions and mismatching is
actually not taking place as long as all companies pay these commissions. In our model contingent
commissions are paid due to a prisonersdilemma situation. Here, these commissions are just a
means for the broker to extract rents from insurance companies.
However, if brokers are by law not allowed to collect any payments from insurance companies,
e¢ cient side-contracting is questionable. As the broker is still interested in executing her endoge-
nous bargaining power, she might be tempted to illegally collect certain payments from a limited
number of insurance companies which might imply certain mismatching incentives. Therefore, as
one important implication, our results indicate that any regulatory action geared towards a ban
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of commission payments to brokers is likely to be ine¤ective, or even worse, might unintentionally
lead to mismatching incentives.
It is important to note that our analysis rests on the assumption of rational expectations. This
approach is straightforward and in line with existing theory. However, it can not explain why
insu¢ cient advice does actually take place in real-world insurance markets with intermediation. In
the light of the recent nancial crisis it seems fruitful to explicitely concentrate on the formation of
expectations and in particular the role of intermediaries in this context. Still, an analysis based upon
rational expectations is an important rst step towards understanding insurance intermediation
which can serve as a benchmark for future research.
Finally, let us briey return to our initial questions regarding compensation basis and trans-
parency. In the light of our analysis it is questionable why the transparency of compensation should
have a signicant impact on advice quality. The specic amount or di¤erences in the size of com-
missions should not be informative per se. However, it might be advantageous for consumers to
know whether contingent commission agreements exist or not.
Our analysis provides us with an explanation of why commissions and in particular contingent
commissions are being used in the market. Due to superior information brokers may possess market
power and commissions may enable them to collect rents based upon this advantage. Generally,
contingent commissions are not necessary for e¢ cient matching, as long as a ban of side-payments
from insurance companies can be enforced. If this is not the case, insurance companies have to agree
upon contingent commissions in order not to lose market share. It needs to be highlighted though
that our assumption of a monopolistic broker market amplies this argument. In a competitive
setting, where brokers possess less or no market power, they cannot collect rents from insurance
companies. In order to generate net income it seems likely that brokers in this situation focus on
consumers via a fee-for-advice system and o¤er additional services.
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